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John Yolton has argued that Locke held a direct realist position
according to which sensory ideas are not perceived intermediaries, as on the
representational realist position, but acts that take material substances as
objects. This paper argues that were Locke to accept the position Yolton
attributes to him he could not at once account for appearance-reality
discrepancies and maintain one of  his most important anti-nativist argu-
ments. The paper goes on to offer an interpretation of  Locke’s distinction
between ideas of  substances and modes, a distinction that helps Locke
to explain appearance-reality discrepancies, although not in a large
enough range of  cases to strengthen Yolton’s interpretation.
 
Locke’s account of the perception of physical objects was received by many
in the eighteenth century as a version of representational realism – the view
that an object is perceived by virtue of the mind’s awareness, of some kind




 Perception of objects,
under this interpretation of Locke, proceeds by way of the perception of
ideas. Consider, for instance, Thomas Reid’s description of Locke’s position:
 
[U]pon Mr. Locke’s principles . . . we cannot think of  Alexander, or of  the planet Jupiter,
unless we have in our minds an idea, that is, an image or picture of  those objects. The idea
of Alexander is an image, or picture, or representation of  that hero in my mind; and this
idea is the immediate object of  my thought when I think of  Alexander. That this was
Locke’s opinion . . . there can be no doubt (Reid, 2002, p. 133).
 
As Reid understood Locke, there are three mental items involved in percep-
tion, in addition to the physical object perceived: the mind itself, a mental
object or representation – that is, an “idea” – and an act of awareness of that
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that he took Locke to offer on a number of well-known grounds. Reid argues,
contra Locke as he reads him, for a direct realist position under which the
mind, in perception, contributes only an act and not, also, some mental
object. This act is an awareness of an external object, and not an awareness
of a mental representation, as on the position that Reid attributes to Locke. 
But was Reid interpreting Locke fairly? John Yolton has argued that Locke
himself considered ideas to be mental acts and, therefore, the relation between
the mental act of awareness of ideas, on the one hand, and ideas themselves,
on the other, is one of identity. If this is so, then there is no tertium quid in




 Yolton has drawn on a large number
of passages from Locke’s corpus to support this point. These passages all seem





 However, any theory of perception must leave room for – and should,
ideally, explain – the possibility of discrepancy between appearance and
reality. It will be argued here that Locke’s views on other subjects preclude
him from accepting any of the possible explanations of appearance-reality
divergence to which a direct realist would need to appeal in defense of the
view. Therefore, although there are admittedly places where Locke sounds
like he advocates the view Yolton takes him to hold, it is not his settled
view, or a view that he would be ready to accept with all its implications.
When we ask how things appear to a particular agent having a perceptual
experience – an experience caused by the agent’s senses – the correct answer
identifies what is often called “the perceptual content” of the perceptual
experience the agent is having. Answers to the question of how things appear
can be right or wrong; if  there appears to be an oasis on the horizon, then
there doesn’t appear to be dry desert there. Any satisfactory theory of
perception will tell us what features of the world and the mind determine
what the perceptual content of a particular person’s perceptual experience
is. Further, in telling us this, a theory of perception will provide (or attempt
to provide) an explanation for the fact that sometimes appearance and
reality diverge. Such divergences occur when there fails to be the appro-
priate line-up between the way things are and the facts about the mind
and the world by virtue of which they appear a certain way. On the view
Yolton attributes to Locke, what features of what part of the world deter-
mine the contents of perceptual states? This question is easy to answer
when asked about the view that Reid attributes to Locke. Under that view,
the ball appears red because of  features of  the idea in the mind of  the









 about the idea accounts for the content of the appearance.
The discrepancy between the way the world is and the way it appears
comes from a discrepancy between the content-fixing feature of the idea
and the feature of the world with which it is correlated. On the represen-
tational realist view, then, much (and possibly all) perceptual content is
determined by the features of ideas.
 
4
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The view Yolton attributes to Locke might take perceptual content to
be fixed by a diversity of things. At least in some cases, the content of a
perceptual state might be fixed by the intrinsic, non-relational features of
the object at which the mental act is directed: what makes this tactile
experience one of roughness might be just that the object I’m touching is
rough. But perceptual content could not be fixed in this way in cases in which
the perceived object is actually intrinsically different from the way it appears.
The problem is that 
 
the very same things
 
 that make it the case that the
object is as it is – it’s intrinsic features – also play the role of determining
how the object appears; without some explanation for why these features
play the former role “correctly” and the latter “incorrectly”, it is hard to
see how there could ever be discrepancy between appearance and reality.
However, there are two other sources of perceptual content to which





 Ducasse. Perhaps, that is, part of what makes an object appear




 in which one perceives the object. Acts,





perhaps the properties of  the mental act of  awareness of  objects con-
tributes to the content of the perceptual experience one has when aware
of them. Or, second, Yolton’s Locke might suggest that perceptual content
is determined in part by the features of the object of which one is aware
 
that that object posesses solely because of its relation to the mind
 
. That is,
the coin in my palm, for instance, has the property of appearing-elliptical-
from-such-and-such-a-location. This is not an intrinsic feature of the
coin, but, instead, a relational feature of the coin that it possesses in part




 By appealing to either of these two
sources of perceptual content, Yolton’s Locke can account for discrepan-
cies between appearance and reality. Since that which fixes the content of
the perceptual state – the features of the act, in the first case, or the rela-
tional features of the object, in the second – is different from that which
determines the features of the object, it seems possible that the two could
fail to line-up as they do when things are as they appear.
But could Locke accept either of these two sources of perceptual content
and their accompanying explanations of appearance-reality divergence?
Against Yolton’s reading of Locke, it will be argued that neither source of
perceptual content is consistent with Locke’s settled philosophical com-
mitments on other issues. Although there is some evidence to suggest that
Locke does take discrepancies between appearance and the intrinsic features
of reality to be accounted for through appeal to the perception of relational
qualities, such a view ultimately depends on some perceptual content
being determined adverbially. Further, Locke cannot accept the adverbial
view. He cannot hold that there is anything about the mental act of
awareness of ideas that contributes to the content of perception without
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argument for these claims succeeds, it follows, at the least, that Locke
does not accept the full implications of  the view that Yolton attributes
to him. Thus, either Yolton’s equation between ideas and the mental acts
misleadingly referred to as “perceptions of ideas” is not, in fact, advoc-
ated by Locke, or else in cases of divergence between appearance and
intrinsic reality Locke takes the content of a perceptual state to be fixed
by something other than either the manner in which the mental act is
performed, or the relational features of the perceived object. But what else
could do the needed job? In the absence of an answer to that question,
Locke ought to be attributed with just the view that Reid attributes to
him: perception of objects proceeds by virtue of the perception of ideas.
However, as will emerge, Locke does think there is a way in which the
content of an inaccurate perceptual state can be fixed by something other
than the features of the immediate object of the mental act, or by the way
in which that act is performed. But it will be argued that, while interesting
in itself, the fact that Locke acknowledges this further source of percep-
tual content still does not provide Yolton with the position that he wants.
 
The perception of relational qualities
 
Can Locke hold that when appearance and reality seem to diverge what
is really happening is that a relational property of  an object is being
perceived that does not match any non-relational, intrinsic, feature of the
object? If  so, then Yolton’s Locke could account for appearance-reality
discrepancy this way. To take this line would be to insist that there is
a sense in which appearance and reality never do diverge. The sense in
which two trees of the same size, seen from different distances, appear to




to be different in size when looked at from such-and-such distances. There
is evidence to suggest that Locke does hold this position. This section
argues, however, that the position itself  is parasitic on a view under which
some perceptual content is fixed adverbially, that is, by means of  the
manner of awareness in which the perceiver engages.
Locke makes a point, in a number of places, of saying that powers are




II.xxi.3). He also associates the




II.viii.10). And, when diagnosing the mistake that people make in
the attribution of sensible qualities to objects, he writes,
 




, and nothing but Powers, relating to
several other Bodies, and resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities;




 in us by
our Senses, 
 
are looked upon as real Qualities, in the things
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Notice the talk of “relation” in this passage. Secondary qualities, he
seems to be saying, are nothing but relational properties that “result”
from the intrinsic properties of the relata. In the case of sensible qualities,
such as colors, the relata are the object and the perceiver. What Locke
seems to suggest here is that the discrepancy between the way things
really are and the way they appear with respect to color is really a mistake
in the way in which colors are “thought of ”, or attributed, and not a
mistake in the way they are seen. We think of the color that we are seeing
as an intrinsic quality of  the object perceived rather than thinking of  it
as what it actually is, a relational quality of the object: being such as to
cause in me certain ideas in normal conditions. This is to offer just the
sort of account of the discrepancy between appearance and reality that
Yolton’s view requires. What are really being perceived in such cases are
relational properties that are mistakenly taken to be intrinsic.
What is it to “take” a perceived relational property to be intrinsic?
Perhaps it is to assign content to a perceptual experience different from
the actual content of that experience. The perceiver might, for instance,
report herself  to be seeing an intrinsic property of the apple when she sees
it as red when, in fact, the immediate object of her perception is a rela-









come from? We might think of what’s going on like this: There are intrin-
sic features of the object – a particular surface texture, for instance – and
there are intrinsic features of the mind – a sensation or a state having
what-it’s-like qualities. The perceiver is really perceiving a relation between
the object and the mind that depends, at least in part, on the intrinsic
features of each. But the perceiver then assigns the content of one mental
state (the sensation) to another (the perception of the relational feature).
Under this analysis, there remains a contentful mental state the content
of which needs to be accounted for. That is, there is an actual contentful
mental state – a sensation – the content of which is being confused with
another, the perception of the relational feature. But then what fixes the
content of the sensation?
There appear to be three possible answers to this question: (1) An
intrinsic property of the mind, (2) The question needs no answer, since
the sensation has no content, or (3) The content of the sensation is fixed
adverbially; that is, through the manner in which the relational feature
of the object is being perceived. As I am about to argue, the first two of
these options are untenable, and so Yolton’s Locke is required to accept
that some mental content is fixed adverbially.
(1) On this view, the sensation is a perception of  an intrinsic feature
of the mind and it is, therefore, that feature that fixes the content of the
sensation. It would seem, on this view, that the perceived feature of the mind
must be possessed by the mind in virtue of the fact that the sensation is
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manifestation of some special feature, and there is the perception of this
feature. The perceived feature is then mistakenly judged to belong to the
object causing the sensation rather than to belong to the mind itself. The
mind is, on this view, spread on the world. It appears, then, that in so far
as it is a bearer of a perceived feature being ascribed to the object, the
sensation is playing the very same role that ideas play under an indirect
realism of the sort that Reid ascribed to Locke. To see this consider cases
of veridical perception (say the perception of the sphericality of a sphere)
and compare them to qualitatively identical cases of  illusion (say the
perception of  the sphericality of  a carefully painted flat, round disk). It
is hard to see why the judgment (i.e. “That’s a sphere.”) should have a
different etiology in the latter cases than it does in the former. But we are
told that in the latter cases, the judgment arises from an ascription of a
quality of the sensation to the object. If  that’s how the judgment arises in
the former cases, however, then Yolton’s Locke is committed to the view
that sensations serve as perceptual intermediaries allowing for the percep-
tion of the qualities of objects that cause them. This is to give up the
game, since the view to which we’ve been reduced is no different from the
view that Reid attributes to Locke.
(2) We could claim that the sensation actually has no content, and so,
of course, nothing determines its content. Notice that on this view the
person to whom reality appears otherwise than it is is making two mis-
takes: first, she is taking her sensation to have content when it actually
has none, and then she is assigning that content – which is actually
nothing at all – to the experience of the object, the actual content of which
is the object’s relational feature. If this view is coherent at all, it encounters
problems with regress: what is it to “take” one’s sensation to have content
when it does not? Either that “taking” is a contentful mental state, in
which case we are back where we began – what fixes its content? – or else
it is contentless. But if  it is contentless, how can its content be assigned to
another mental state? 
(3) Yolton’s Locke should answer that the content of the sensation is
fixed adverbially. That is, the object has a relational feature – being such
as to appear a certain way – and the perceiver is perceiving that feature
in a particular way; red-ly, say. To speak of  the sensation, on this view,





 that act’s immediate object (namely the object’s relational
quality). Even subtracting its object, however, this mental act has content
by virtue of the manner in which it is being performed. If  this third
answer is, as it appears, the only viable answer, then the Yolton inter-
pretation requires appeal to the adverbial view of  the source of  mental
content, even if  perceptual content is thought to be fixed, in part, by the
relational features of the perceived object. It is to the adverbial approach
that I now turn.
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Ways of perceiving
 
So, consider the suggestion that Locke takes perceptual content to be fixed
adverbially. To see a red apple is to see an apple red-ly. What I’ll argue in this
section is that such a position is inconsistent with one of Locke’s more





Locke’s oft-maligned argument against innate ideas is far more interest-
ing than it is usually given credit for being. Perhaps the reason that it is
so often maligned is that the real insight of the discussion is not to be
found so much in Locke’s anti-nativist conclusion as it is to be found in
his way of getting there: his remarkably nuanced and systematic examina-
tion of the various senses in which the content of a thought can be said
to be “in a person’s mind” when it is so obscured from her view that she
would not assent to propositions involving it. Those with nativist sympa-




(cf. Leibniz, 1981, pp. 90–91) –
always insist that there is a sense in which content can be in the mind that
Locke fails to notice, and, further, that that sense is the most important
one for establishing the nativist position. If  Locke thought that percep-
tual content could derive from the manner of perception – the adverbial
view that could supplement Yolton’s interpretation – then, as I’ll argue,
Locke would have to allow a sense in which content could be in the mind





 be arguing that an adverbialist about mental content must be a
nativist – a claim which is probably false, in any event. Rather, I’m going
to argue that an adverbialist about mental content cannot accept one of
Locke’s more interesting anti-nativist arguments; an adverbialist might
reject nativism on other grounds – on grounds, even, that Locke himself
offers against nativism in other contexts. Even if  I’m right, this is no
vindication of Locke’s anti-nativist argument, since perhaps he should have
allowed that content could be fixed through the manner of perception.
However, it is very strong evidence that Locke would eschew a way of
understanding what it is for content to be in the mind that Yolton’s inter-
pretation would have him accept.
After having dispensed with explicit, occurrent, universal knowledge of
a proposition as a test for innateness, Locke goes on to consider a subtler
view of  the sense in which a proposition can be in the mind prior to
experience. According to this alternative, a proposition is in a person’s
mind if  she would grasp it were she to exercise her capacity for reason.
Locke responds, 
 
. . . By this Means there will be no difference between the Maxims of  the Mathematicians,
and Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allow’d innate, they being all
Discoveries made by the use of  Reason, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly
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The loss of a distinction in innateness between the axioms and the theorems
of mathematics might not, itself, be considered much of a loss. Why shouldn’t
the theorems be innate? However, Locke goes on to explain why it is a
loss: it implies that no propositions are genuinely axiomatic. He writes:
 
[I ]t must be confessed, that in their [logical axioms] Discovery, there is no Use made of
reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm,
That the Knowledge of  this Maxim, 
 
That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not
to be
 
, is a deduction of  our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of  Nature,
they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of  those Principles to depend on the
labour of  our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains
and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos’d, that what was
imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of  our Reason, should need the Use of






It is tempting to read this passage as a statement of  the blustering
theological point that a nativist of the sort under discussion is committed
to a characterization of the creator as one who gives us knowledge while,
for no particular reason, making it difficult for us to grasp. This point does
contribute to the rhetorical force of the passage , but Locke has a more
important point in mind, a point deriving from his view of  reason as
the discovery of, and perception of agreement between, intermediate
ideas and those involved in a demonstrable or probable proposition. He






[Reason] is necessary, and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed con-
tains two of them, 
 
viz. Sagacity and Illation
 
. By the one, it finds out, and by the other, it so




, as to discover what connexion there is in each link of  the
Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view








, and consists in nothing but




, in each step of  the deduction,




, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable connexion,
on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion . . . [T]he Faculty which finds out
the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the






The exercise of  reason, then, is a two step process. First we think up
intermediate ideas – ideas that will serve to connect, say, the idea of the
subject of a proposition and the idea of the predicate; then we perceive





 The intermediate ideas provide “the reason for” the pro-
position grasped through reason. Armed with this account of reason we
can ask what it means to say that we grasp an axiom through reason. The
answer appears to be that we think up ideas that mediate between the
ideas involved in the axiom and perceive the needed agreements. What
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 those axioms. But if there are reasons for axioms, their axiomatic
status is undermined. An axiom is an axiom because it is true even
though there are no reasons in favor of its truth. 
There is a nativist response to this argument that would be on the tip of
the tongue of anyone who holds that mental content can be fixed adver-
bially. Perhaps to say that the grasping of a mathematical theorem is an
exercise of reason is just to say that it is an act of perceiving – grasping –
in a particular, distinctive way that brings in the content of the axioms.
That is, what makes the perception of the ideas involved in a mathemat-




 of  reason – it involves a manner of perceiving that accounts for the
inclusion of the axiomatic propositions in the content of the perception.
To perceive a proof, we might say, is to perceive axiomatic-ly. The idea
would be that a nativist can account for a distinction between axioms and
theorems while still holding that what makes mental content innate is its
accessibility through reason alone. To exercise one’s reason, on this view,
would be to engage in a kind of mental activity that, by its very nature,
includes the content of the axioms. The axioms are in the mind through




them. The grasping of them, we might say, is the condition of the pos-
sibility of the activity of giving reasons for any proposition at all. This is,
of course, a very Kantian idea but it is the sort of idea that would be
obvious to anyone who held that mental content can be fixed adverbially.
Why didn’t Locke see it? Answer: Because he doesn’t think that mental
content can be fixed adverbially.
Let me summarize the argument just offered. Locke considers the
following criterion for innateness:
 
Rational Accessibility Criterion of Innateness
 
: An idea is innate if  and
only if  it can be had solely through the exercise of reason.
He then claims that this criterion of innateness implies the following:
 
Equality of Axioms and Theorems
 
: The axioms and the theorems of logic
and mathematics do not differ in their degree of innateness.
He then invokes the following view of reason which is expressed at large






Reason as Sagacity and Illation
 
: Reasoning is the process of discovering
intermediate ideas and perceiving their agreement with those involved
in a proposition.
He then claims that the Equality of Axioms and Theorems conjoined
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are reasons for axioms, and, therefore, axioms are not axioms at all. It is
this point that is summarized in his sarcastic question,
 
[H]ow can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos’d, that what was imprinted by Nature, as







Since Locke takes his view of Reason as Sagacity and Illation to be given,
he concludes that the Rational Accessibility Criterion of Innateness implies
a contradiction. What I’ve argued is that the way to avoid this argument,
and thus defend the Rational Accessibility Criterion of Innateness, is to
assert that mental content can be fixed adverbially. That claim defeats
Locke’s inference from the conjunction of the claim of Equality of Axioms
and Theorems and the view of Reason as Sagacity and Illation, to the
conclusion that axioms are not axioms; axioms could be in the mind





Lockean reply to this objection is to deny that mental content can be
fixed adverbially. But to ascribe such a denial to Locke is to weaken
Yolton’s interpretation.
Before considering objections to this argument it is important to head-





Locke is explicitly engaged not with a criterion for the innateness of an
idea, but with a criterion for the innateness of a proposition. He turns




I.iv. Isn’t it inaccurate, then, to describe Locke as arguing against
the Rational Accessibility Criterion of Innateness, which is a criterion for
innate ideas, rather than innate propositions? No, for Locke thinks that
if  a proposition is innate, then the ideas out of which the proposition is
built are innate. As he puts the point: 
 




. sterling in his Pocket,
and yet denied, that he hath there either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of















I.ii is committed, he thinks, to the claim that the ideas that
make up the axioms are innate for the reason described in the Rational
Accessibility Criterion. If  it is possible, then, to bring content into the
mind through the manner in which one accepts a proposition, then it is
possible to bring ideas into the mind through the manner in which
one perceives those ideas. This is precisely what Locke’s anti-nativist
argument commits him to denying; but it is also just what Yolton’s Locke
must insist upon in order to account for discrepancies between appearance
and reality.
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The argument just offered can be resisted. It might be suggested, for
instance, that there’s a disanalogy between the mental activities involved
in, on the one hand, grasping a proposition through reason and, on the
other, sensory perception. We might then suggest that Locke could allow
the adverbial supplementation of mental content in the case of sense per-
ception while denying it in the case of the activity of giving and grasping
reasons for particular propositions. What really motivates this line of









 the indubitability of certain
propositions (logical axioms) when engaging in a certain mental activity
(namely the activity of giving reasons). In the latter case, what is meant is
that the activity of giving reasons would have no point or purpose if  the
axioms of logic were not accepted by the person engaging in the activity;
without such a presupposition, no intermediate ideas could serve to
support a claim of an agreement between the ideas they mediate between.
But in what sense could the point or purpose of perceiving an apple depend
on a supposition of its redness? The worry is that there appears to be no
analogy between perceiving-in-a-manner, and presupposing logical axioms.
In response to this objection, note that one need not have a very clear
idea of the notion of supplementing mental content adverbially (as I must









 any particular bit of content that a mental act has, could, in
principle, derive from the manner in which that act is performed. This, by




 that the claim that the axioms
are presupposed in exercises of reason is to be accounted for by saying
that the relevant mental act is performed in a manner that accounts for
the fact that the content of the axioms is in the mind of the person engag-
ing in that mental act. No one who accepts the coherence of the idea of
adverbial content supplementation should deny this possibility, and
Locke’s anti-nativist argument rehearsed above does require denying it.
So, although one could consistently maintain that sensory content is, in
fact, supplemented adverbially and the content of axioms presupposed in
the exercise of  reason is not, in fact, included adverbially, one cannot





 that the content of axioms is included in exercises of
reason because of the manner in which those mental acts are performed.
There’s a degree of analogy between sensory perception and exercises of
reason that cannot be denied and would be sufficient to make trouble for
Locke’s anti-nativist argument were he to accept that any mental content,
in any context, is fixed adverbially.
Another line of objection might suggest that Locke would not be bothered
by the idea that the content of axioms could be included in the mind
through the manner of awareness involved in the exercise of reason. After
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thoughts about axioms are innate, and it is that conclusion that would
bother Locke. It might be suggested, that is, that the very manner of
awareness involved in the exercise of reason is acquired through experi-
ence, in which case Locke could maintain his anti-nativist conclusion
while also holding that mental content is fixed adverbially. By similar
reasoning, after all, Locke would not have to be a nativist about the idea of
red in order to hold that the content of that idea is fixed adverbially. But
this objection misses the mark. Locke is not trying to show, at this point,
that mathematical concepts and the axioms that follow from them are not





of the way in which mathematical concepts are acquired through experi-
ence. What Locke is after here is a criterion for innateness under which
the claim that ideas are innate is neither trivial – everything or nothing
turns out to be innate – nor false. The criterion under consideration is the
Rational Accessibility Criterion. What he is offering is an argument
against the cogency of that criterion, not an argument for or against the
native status of any particular set of concepts. To admit that content can
be fixed adverbially is also to admit that the Rational Accessibility Cri-




 that Locke hopes to reject.
Perhaps the most powerful objection to my argument runs thus:
 
7 Some-
one who believes that mental content can be supplemented adverbially
and also holds that the content of logical axioms is in the mind because
of the manner in which certain mental acts (the exercises of reason) are
performed needn’t see himself  as developing the Rational Accessibility
Criterion of Innateness. Such a person might say, instead, that there are
really two different ways in which a proposition can be innate: either
because it is discovered through the exercise of reason, or because it is
presupposed by any exercise of reason. Perhaps the argument of Locke’s
rehearsed above is not intended to respond to someone who takes the
second of these two disjuncts to be sufficient for innateness, but that still
Locke allows that the content of the axioms could be in the mind in this
way. If  so, we would expect Locke to engage with (and reject) this further
sufficient condition for innateness elsewhere. Arguably, he does so when
in Essay I.ii.17–24 he addresses the view that a proposition is innate if
self-evident to those who understand it. Therefore, the fact that Locke’s
argument against the Rational Accessibility Criterion of Innateness can
be defeated by extending the list of those things known through reason to
include those propositions that are included in our thoughts by virtue of
the manner in which we think when using reason does not show that he
rejects the possibility of an adverbial source of mental content. He might
simply be leaving that possibility for discussion later.8
This objection is damaging to my argument only if  Locke thinks that
the class of propositions presupposed by an exercise of reason, on the one
LOCKE ON IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE 267
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hand, and the class of those that are self-evident to someone who under-
stands them, on the other, are the same class. Without this claim, there is
no reason to think the discussion of Essay I.ii.17–24 to be aimed at those
who think that the content of the axioms is in the mind innately because
of the manner in which exercises of reason are performed. But, in fact,
there is strong evidence to the contrary, for in rejecting the claim that a
proposition is innate if  self-evident to those who understand it, Locke
claims that according to this criterion true propositions such as “Yellow-
ness is not sweetness” (Essay I.ii.18) are innate, and he remarks, 
But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the Ideas, about which it is, be innate, This
will be, to suppose all our Ideas of  Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, etc. innate; than
which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience (I.ii.18).
The argument that Locke offers here fails to discriminate between those
propositions that are self-evident because they are presupposed by our
exercises of reason, and those that are self-evident because the ideas
involved manifestly agree or fail to agree. Further it only succeeds in
rebutting the self-evidence criterion of innateness if  all self-evident prop-
ositions are of the latter sort. So, someone trying to use an appeal to an
adverbial source of  content to establish the innateness of  the logical
axioms could object here. Such a person would say that what Locke has
illustrated is the undeniable fact that the class of propositions presup-
posed by our exercises of  reason is a proper subset of  the class of  self-
evident propositions, a fact that is not troubling to someone who takes
only the former class to be innate. Were Locke willing to admit that con-
tent could be supplemented adverbially, however, he would have to agree
that his argument here unfairly equates two different criteria of innateness.
We are then forced to hold either that Locke does not think that mental
content can be supplemented adverbially, or else that his arguments against
innate ideas fail for reasons that he himself  accepts. Charity, it seems to
me, demands the former interpretation.
Let’s take stock. We’ve considered two possible supplemental sources
of perceptual content consistent with the position Yolton attributes to
Locke: relational qualities in the world, and ways of perceiving qualities
of  the world. I’ve argued that the first source only makes sense of  cases
of  divergence between appearance and reality if  the second source is
also appealed to. Then I’ve argued that the second source can only be
accepted by someone who eschews Locke’s anti-nativist argument. Given
that Locke, at least, accepts this argument, he must eschew the adverbial
view of perceptual content. The conclusion that I want, however, is that
all of this shows that Locke accepts the model of perception attributed to
him by Reid and not the view attributed to him by Yolton. But this con-
clusion only follows if  there isn’t some third source of perceptual content
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that could be accepted by Yolton’s Locke and which would allow for
discrepancy between appearance and reality. In the next section, I want
to draw out a third source of  perceptual content that Locke himself,
I will argue, recognizes. However, I’ll also argue that that third source
of  perceptual content does not provide room for appearance-reality
divergence.
Another source of perceptual content
In various passages in the late chapters of book II of the Essay, Locke
specifies ways in which ideas are to be classified – as adequate or inade-
quate, real or fantastical, and true or false – through the ways in which
they do and do not live up to that for which they were “intended”. This
intention-talk is rather puzzling. Rarely do we concoct ideas with an
explicit intention, anyway, of doing anything with them. There are, of
course, exceptions: I think of a soccer ball in order to test the powers of
the man claiming to be able to read minds, for instance. But Locke seems
to think that the distinctions between, for instance, adequate and inade-
quate ideas divide logical space: every idea is either adequate or inade-
quate, and thus he must think that every idea is intended for something.
Although in places Locke seems to say that the relevant intentions are
those of the person whose ideas are under consideration, this is probably
not his settled view. Rather, Locke must mean that various ideas have
a particular purpose, function or role. Ideas are to be classified as, say,
adequate or inadequate in so far as they live up, or fail to live up, to that
role in some way or another.
Locke’s distinction between ideas of modes and ideas of substance
tracks a distinction between two different purposes for which ideas are
“intended”. For instance, having argued that our ideas of modes are all of
them adequate, Locke writes:
But in our Ideas of  Substances, it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy Things, as they
really do exist . . . we perceive our Ideas attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they
still want something, we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mixed
Modes and Relations, being Archetypes without Patterns, and so having nothing to repre-
sent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He that at first
put together the Idea of Danger perceived, absence of disorder from Fear, sedate considera-
tion of  what was justly to be done, and executing of  that without disturbance, or being
deterred by the danger of  it, had certainly in his Mind that complex Idea made up of  that
Combination: and intending it to be nothing else, but what it is; nor to have in it any other
simple Ideas, but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate Idea (Essay II.xxxi.3).
There are a couple of things to note about this passage. First, notice
Locke’s way of describing mode-ideas at the end of the passage: they are
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not intended to have in them any simple ideas but those that they do have
in them. Taken literally, this suggests that in a substance-idea, by con-
trast, we intend that the idea have in it something more than what it has
in it. Let’s say that what an idea “has in it” is its presented content: it has
in it all and only those aspects of the way things appear that are deter-
mined by the instrinsic features of the idea itself. By its very nature the
intention involved in ideas of  substance cannot be determined by the
presented content of the idea. After all, the intention, as Locke describes
it, is that the idea should represent more than what it presents. The inten-
tion determines whether the idea is a mode-idea or a substance-idea. So,
assuming one has a different thought depending on which category one’s
idea falls into, and assuming that what makes two thoughts different is
that they have different content, the passage seems to commit Locke to
the view that something beyond the presented content of one’s idea
(namely, the idea’s function or purpose) sometimes contributes to the full
content of one’s thought.
The passage also describes the two different functions of ideas of sub-
stance and mode. If  the idea’s purpose is to represent actual things, then
it is an idea of substance; if  it’s purpose is to serve as a tool for the sorting
and systematizing of the particulars one encounters, then it is an idea of
a mode. This difference in function makes a difference to the content of
thoughts involving these different ideas, as follows: Since an idea of sub-
stance is intended to represent features of an object beyond those that it
explicitly presents to the mind, it succeeds in being about parts of the
world that the intrinsically identical mode-idea does not concern. To have
an idea of  substance is, seemingly paradoxically, to think about those
features of an object which your idea does not present to you.
To illustrate, imagine that before me I have an object that is round, red,
and rough. I am not touching the object, and have in my mind a complex
idea that presents to me only roundness and redness. Further, imagine
that I know nothing of  features of  the object other than its roundness
and redness. Were I asked if  the object is rough, I would have no opinion
either way. Now imagine this idea is a mode-idea, intended to do no more
than to help me to classify the particulars around me. Then my idea is in
no sense about the object’s roughness. All that would happen were rough-
ness added to the presented content of my idea is that I would have a new
tool for classifying particulars, and systematizing my experience. I would
not have a better tool than I have when I have the idea that includes
nothing but round and red, but instead, just a new conceptual category:
round-red-rough. As Locke would put it, my idea would be no more
“adequate” were it’s presented content expanded to include roughness.
Now imagine that the idea is a substance-idea, intended to represent this
particular thing as it is, quite independently of  my thought. Then my
idea is about all of  the object’s features, although some, in particular the
270 PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
© 2004 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
object’s roughness, are not presented to me by the idea. My idea manages
to be about a feature of the object that is not exhibited to my mind. The
idea manages to do this solely because it is intended to stand for the
object, including the features of the object about which I know nothing.
My mental model would improve – my idea would become more ad-
equate – were my idea to include the idea of roughness, but not because
it came now to be about a feature that it was not previously about, but,
instead, because it would then represent as it is a feature that my idea was
previously about only as an I-know-not-what. Substance-ideas are about
what they do not explicitly represent because they are about whatever
features the object has, even those that the idea does not explicitly
represent the object as possessing.
Recall that what makes it possible to account for (or, at least, leave
room for) divergence between appearance and reality within a direct real-
ist view of the sort that Yolton attributes to Locke is a claim to the effect
that those things that determine how the world is are distinct from those
that determine how things appear. We considered two possible sources
for perceptual content that satisfy this demand: properties of the mental
act of awareness (that is, ways of perceiving) and relational properties of
objects (that is, being such as to appear a certain way). Neither source by
itself, it’s been argued, can be accepted by Locke. But now we have a third
possible candidate that Locke himself  seems to be proposing: the content
of a thought is determined, in part at least, by the purpose or function
that the perceived idea is meant to serve. Since this function is not
what accounts for the features of the object perceived, it is theoretically
possible that appeal to it could leave room for appearance-reality
divergence.
But does it? Unfortunately for the direct realist interpretation of Locke,
it does not. The problem is that the only additional content that the idea’s
function supplies is of “something more” than what is to be found explic-
itly in the idea. There is a class of cases of appearance-reality divergence
that can be accounted for here, but the class is very small. For instance,
my idea of  the monster on the movie screen is an idea of  substance –
I represent the object as possessing features other than those explicitly
presented to me in my idea – but, in fact, the object possesses no features
beyond those of  which I am explicitly aware. There is no fact of  the
matter, for instance, about whether or not the underbelly of the beast is
covered with polka dots if that matter isn’t settled by anything that appears
on the screen. So, in this case, since my idea is an idea of substance, and
since the monster has no qualities beyond those explicitly presented, how
things appear to me, and how they are, diverge. But most cases are not
like this. Usually, there is divergence between appearance and reality
precisely because features are presented to one which are not to be found
anywhere in reality. How could the function of an idea supply, say, the
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pinkness of the white cat perceived in pink light? How could it supply the
size differential of the two ten foot trees one of which is farther away than
the other? Although an idea’s function can supply content to a thought
that is not presented, that function cannot supply the kind of  content
to perceptual experience that an act-based view of the mental needs in
order to account for most cases of divergence between appearance and
reality.
Conclusion
Under the view of perception that I, following Reid, attribute to Locke,
much of the content of perceptual experience is given by the features of
the directly perceived item, the idea. This is to say that at least some
features of the world can be encountered directly and unproblematically:
namely, the features of our ideas. It is no surprise that Reid should have
seen this concession as an invitation to direct realism. As Reid puts the
point himself:
We are at a loss to know how we perceive distant objects; how we remember things past; how
we imagine things that have no existence. Ideas in the mind seem to account for all these
operations. They are all by the means of  ideas reduced to one operation; to a kind of
feeling, or immediate perception of things present and in contact with the percipient . . . But
this feeling, or immediate perception, is as difficult to be comprehended, as the things
which we pretend to explain by it (Reid, 2002, p. 185).
If  the encounter with the idea, the encounter that gives rise to contentful
mental experience, is so unproblematic, why is it thought necessary at all?
Why not allow that we have the very same encounter with objects external
to our minds?
Little can be said in response to this except to appeal to the theoretical
advantages of the model of the mental that Locke, I’ve argued, espouses.
Perhaps some things are explained under that model that cannot be
explained under the act-based view espoused by Reid himself, and
attributed to Locke by Yolton. One problematic case for the Reidian
model are cases of  discrepancy between appearance and reality. What
has been argued here is that the ways that a Reidian might respond to
such difficulties are not available to Locke: they open doors to sub-
stantive philosophical positions friendly to nativism that Locke took
himself  to have closed. And so it is best to read Locke as endorsing a
veil of perception, just as he was thought to have done by many of his
eighteenth-century interpreters.9
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NOTES
1 Not all of  Locke’s early intepreters read him in this way. For discussion of  some who
interpreted him otherwise, see Yolton, 1984, pp. 98–101. I do not entirely endorse Yolton’s
interpretation of  Reid, however. Yolton correctly points out that Reid thinks Locke uses
the term ‘idea’ sometimes to mean a mental object, sometimes a mental act. However,
Yolton doesn’t point out that Reid also thinks that Locke’s official position does not leave
open the construal of  ideas as mental acts whose objects are extra-mental particulars.
When Locke uses the term ‘idea’ to refer to a mental act, he is slipping on his official
position, according to Reid.
2 Lex Newman has suggested to me in conversation that things might be more complicated
than I suggest here. If  Locke held that there is a mere “distinction of  reason” between the
modification of  the mind, the mental act, and its intentional content, then there could be a
sense in which there is a tertium quid in his theory of  perception (when ideas are conceived
of  as intentional contents) and a sense in which there is none (when ideas are conceived
of as mental acts). I am not certain, however, how different this interpretation is from the
view that Yolton attributes to Locke. On both views, when external obects are perceived
they are the immediate obects of  a mental act that attaches to the object by virtue of  the
act’s intentional content. But the intentional content is not, itself, an object of  perception.
3 Yolton, 1984, pp. 88–94. To give just one of  Yolton’s examples, Locke writes, “To ask,
at what time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having Ideas,
and Perception being the same thing.” (Essay II.1.9).
4 There is a logical space for a representational realist of  the sort Reid takes Locke to be
to claim that features of  ideas fix perceptual content only when there is divergence between
appearance and reality. This, however, would be to deny that there is a “common factor”
in veridical perception, on the one hand, and sensory illusion, on the other. 
5 There might be other possibilities. The final section of  this paper discusses one possible
third source of  perceptual content. However, if  there are other possibilities yet – other
explanations for how appearance and reality can diverge on the view that Yolton attributes
to Locke – then there is room for an objector to insist that Locke does hold the view
Yolton attributes to him and accepts this alternative explanation. Although I think it unlikely
that such an objection can be constructed (because I think it unlikely that yet another
explanation can be found that Locke would be willing to accept with all its implications)
nothing to be said here rules out the possibility.
6 Strictly speaking the relation between the mediating ideas and those they mediate
between will not always be “agreement”. When the relevant ideas do agree, we have genu-
ine knowledge; when we merely suppose them to agree, we have belief, or “probability”.
7 This objection was raised by Jonathan Vogel at the 2000 Pacific APA where an earlier
version of  this paper was presented. Martha Bolton developed it in further discussion and
convinced me that my response to Vogel at the time was not satisfactory.
8 This objection can be supported further by noting that in Essay I.II.10, immediately
following his attack on the Rational Accessibility Criterion of  Innateness, Locke mentions
the view that a proposition is innate if  self-evident to those who understand it and says that
he will be discussing that possibility soon.
9 Thanks to Martha Bolton, Vere Chappell, Peter Graham, Robin Jeshion, Lex Newman,
John Rogers and Jonathan Vogel, all of  whom offered valuable comments on an earlier
draft of  this paper.
